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Account
Abstract
In the world of Organization research, some words are used by scholarswith a specific political purpose:
two of these are ethics and emancipation. The second is used to recall the social purpose ofthe
academic community, which can be donefromseveral perspectives (for example, that of Critical
Management Studies). Regarding ethics, organization researchers often use this word to denounce
managerial practices.Their researchcommonly reports the ideological orientation of such management
practices as imply unethical behaviour. In this sense, the unethical orientation of managers has been seen
as something masked by a manipulative discourse, which has built the false impression that
management practices are ethically oriented.But the organization researchers say almost nothing about
their own demagogicethical discourse, even though their silence has led to the criticism of academics for
“lack of ethics.” This paper deals with the problem of ethics as it relates to the research practicesof
organization studiesitself, showing some aspects of the ways in which ethics is handled by researchers in
their fieldwork. To this end, it adopts Habermas’ view of discursive ethics, in particular, his conception of
strategic action. In this sense, strategic action ignores ethical claims, because it is oriented to
performative and utilitarian interests. Thus, when a speaker performs a strategic action, s/he distorts
communicative interaction by omitting or manipulating information (distorting truthfulness), being
insincere about her/his actual intentions and/or claiming feelings which s/he lacks (distorting sincerity),
adopting illegitimate or subverting legitimate moral claims (distortion of legitimacy) and/or being
confused or ambiguous about what s/he is saying (distorting comprehensibility). My argument is
presented in the form of three different research examples, which reveal how strategic action emerges in
critical research enterprises and how ethical claims are disregarded.In the end, I explore my own research
experience, telling a confessional story, which illustrates strategic action in the critical organizational
research field. The exemplary cases show that, in addition to the absence of ethical consciousness,
researchers are pressurized to supply opportunistic reports of research findings and ‘discoveries,’in order
to merit further qualifications. To be successful, researchers are prepared to be opportunistic and hence
unethical.
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Ethics and/or Success in Conducting Organization Studies:
A Habermasian Account
Fabio Vizeu
Universidade Positivo (UP), Curitiba, Brazil
In the world of Organization research, some words are used by scholarswith a
specific political purpose: two of these are ethics and emancipation. The
second is used to recall the social purpose ofthe academic community, which
can be donefromseveral perspectives (for example, that of Critical
Management Studies). Regarding ethics, organization researchers often use
this word to denounce managerial practices.Their researchcommonly reports
the ideological orientation of such management practices as imply unethical
behaviour. In this sense, the unethical orientation of managers has been seen
as something masked by a manipulative discourse, which has built the false
impression that management practices are ethically oriented.But the
organization researchers say almost nothing about their own
demagogicethical discourse, even though their silence has led to the criticism
of academics for “lack of ethics.” This paper deals with the problem of ethics
as it relates to the research practicesof organization studiesitself, showing
some aspects of the ways in which ethics is handled by researchers in their
fieldwork. To this end, it adopts Habermas’ view of discursive ethics, in
particular, his conception of strategic action. In this sense, strategic action
ignores ethical claims, because it is oriented to performative and utilitarian
interests. Thus, when a speaker performs a strategic action, s/he distorts
communicative interaction by omitting or manipulating information
(distorting truthfulness), being insincere about her/his actual intentions and/or
claiming feelings which s/he lacks (distorting sincerity), adopting illegitimate
or subverting legitimate moral claims (distortion of legitimacy) and/or being
confused or ambiguous about what s/he is saying (distorting
comprehensibility). My argument is presented in the form of three different
research examples, which reveal how strategic action emerges in critical
research enterprises and how ethical claims are disregarded.In the end, I
explore my own research experience, telling a confessional story, which
illustrates strategic action in the critical organizational research field. The
exemplary cases show that, in addition to the absence of ethical
consciousness, researchers are pressurized to supply opportunistic reports of
research findings and ‘discoveries,’in order to merit further qualifications. To
be successful, researchers are prepared to be opportunistic and hence
unethical.Keywords: Organization Studies, Ethics, Fieldwork, Habermas,
Strategic Action.
In profit organizations most of all, the critical organizational research has faced
problematic conditions. In general, one of the biggest problems in the broad field of
organizational research is the difficulty of accessing datafrom an organization and even of
entry (Bell, 1999). In part, this difficulty occurs because managers may fear that the research
data will be used against the organization and its members. They often see organizational
researchers as a threat.
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In this sense, organizational research is hard to undertake, because the members of an
organization are often afraid that the claims made by researchers will be disturbing (Alvesson
& Deetz, 2000). They are afraid of what researchers will do with the collected data, or what
they may request in their interaction with the organization. For this reason, it is very common
for staff to ignore information, hide important data, or in some other way make the research
project unfeasible.
This is partly because organizational researchers are nowadays more and more
concerned with ethics in particular. In the broad field of management research, the ethical
theme seems to be growing into one of the mostimportant study subjects developed in recent
years, partly in consequence of the reflexivity and criticism surrounding the role of
management and the influence of the dominant corporate interest in the results of managers’
actions (Parker, 1998). In critical organization studies, business ethics is a central theme, in
particular, as a subject of criticism for its anti-foundationalist ethical approach (Collins &
Wray-Bliss, 2005).
This paper deals with this problem by seeking to clarify how ethics is considered by
organization researchers when engaged in fieldwork. To reach this point, it adopts Habermas’
view of discursive ethics, concentrating on his conception of strategic action. For Habermas,
this kind of social action is the opposite of communicative action, an act of speech free of
constraint, which is also concerned with ethical commitment. In this sense, strategic action
lacks ethical claims because it is an action oriented to performative and utilitarian interests.
This argument is demonstrated by presenting three different research examples, which reveal
how strategic action emerges in critical research enterprises and how ethical claims are
disregarded in this situation. In the end, I explore my own research experience, telling a
confessional story, which shows an example of strategic action in critical organizational
research.
This paper is structured in five parts. First, it discusses the locus of ethics in
organization studies, which is not only an important subject for criticism, but also a subject
for seriousconsideration in research practice. Then, it discusses Habermas’ Theory of
Communicative Action, introducing his theoretical framework of discursive ethics. Next, it
moves to discussing how strategic action appears in critical organizational research.
Following this, I give a confessional example from my fieldwork experience. Finally, the
conclusion is reached that many critical researchers adopts opportunistic behaviour in
response to academic pressures, which are exerted to guarantee the productivity claim of
capitalist interests, in the same way asany other job in our society.
The locus of ethics in organization studies
Organization researchers usually deal with ethics in the sense of reporting the
ideological orientation of such management practices as imply unethical behaviour (for
example, Banerjee, 2008; Shrivastava, 1986). In this sense, the unethical orientation of
managers has been seen as something masked by a manipulative discourse, which has built
the false impression that management practices are ethically oriented. This means that
organization researchers often see as problematic the way in which managers and
corporations build a false sense of morality around their recent work on social programmes;
for example, those for corporate social responsibility and employees’ health (Collins &
Wray-Bliss, 2005; Haunschild, 2003; Parker, 1998; Roberts, 2003).
For this reason, when organization research is under review, ethical claims can arise
which test the researcher’s discourse-practice coherency, for researchers are, of course, not
immune from ethical considerations in their own practice. Although the ethics debate is
almost non-existent in this academic group (Bell & Bryman, 2007; Brewis & Wray-Bliss,
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2008), the lack of ethics has been subject to some criticism of writers on critical organization
and management. For example, Collins and Wray-Bliss (2005) note the discriminatory ethics
among Critical Management Studies scholars. It is also clear that when organization
fieldwork is undertaken, everyone’s ethical claims become more evident (Alcadipani &
Hodgson, 2009).
It seems inescapable that commitment to an ethical theme should compel organization
researchers to adopt ethics in their own research practice. However, when they are challenged
by the difficulty of access and other pressures, this ethical claim becomes difficult to meet
(Alcadipani & Hodgson, 2009). In other words, organization researchers are faced with the
dilemma of being either ethical or successful in their research, and both terms must be
considered as central concepts in a Habermasian framework, as we will see in the next
section of this paper. To clarify how this dilemma arises for the organization researcher, we
use the ethics of discourse proposed by Habermas.
Ethics challenged by the utilitarian view: The theory of communicative action
The work of Habermas has been an important approach for the organizational analysis
that takes a critical perspective (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996). Starting from the philosophy of
language, Habermas proposed a theory, which focuses on intersubjective relationships. Its
application in organizational reality can provide an interesting critique about managerial
practices and the rationality of modern organizations (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996; Burrell,
1994; Forester, 1983).
Supported by a very heterogeneous theoretical basis, Habermas (1985, 1989) built a
deep theory of social action, called Communicative Action Theory. It is based on the social
construction of reality, which results from intersubjective interaction. This approach is based
on the linguistic dimension of social action, which is based on intersubjective interaction in
speech acts with rational claims (Forester, 1983).
Seeking to continue the original project of the Frankfurt School, Habermas proposes a
paradigmatic shift to deal with the problem of modern reason. In this sense, he finds an
answer in the philosophy of language, following the tendency in social sciences called the
‘linguistic turn’. In this approach, the emancipatory claim of reason is reached through the
intersubjective interaction, which is practised by members of the same communicative
community. In this paradigm, communication is the centre of a social process, because is
through communication that human beings are able to interact and built their signification of
the world (Forester, 1983). Considering these issues, Habermas claimed that he had formed a
theory of “Communicative Action” (Habermas, 1985, 1989).
Supported by the philosophy of language, Habermas (1985) could avoid the
teleological point of view of rationality – that is, the assumption which considers as rational
the behavior or perspective that provides the best relation between ends and means – which
emerges from the tradition of Conscious Philosophy and circumscribes the rational attribute
of social action to the limits of the objective dimension of human relations. This is the
essence of Habermas’ critique of the Weberian concept of rationality, which is monologic
and, for this reason, is conceived as rational only from the agent’s perspective. Habermas
instead defends a re-signification of the rational attribute of social action, which can be
imputed to both the subjects involved in any social interaction.
Habermas (1985) also found in symbolic interactionism the theoretical complement to
solving the problem of integrating individualization and socialization. Focusing on the
process of self-representation, this approach shows how the link between subjectivity and
objectivity is made by social interaction symbolically mediated and representing the concept
of the social role. In other words, social reality is “objective” in the sense that it is the result
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of the process of adjusting meanings, that is to say, social objectivity is reached by intersubjectivity (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).
For Habermas, there are three ontological dimensions to consider in his intention to
re-conceptualize the rational attribute of social action: (i) the objective world, where reality is
constituted as a state of external objects and facts, which exist independently of subjects and
are perceived from a realistic perspective (Burrell & Morgan, 1979); (ii) the subjective world,
which is the internal dimension of each person’s subjectivity, the possibility of accessing the
reality of each person’s mind and feelings, which no one else can penetrate or know in full;
and (iii) the normative world, which represents our cultural reality and the process of
legitimating individual acts in a social dimension. Habermas argues that, to be called rational,
something must make these three ontologies cohere with one another.
Habermas found the basis of his theory by joining symbolic interactionism to Austin’s
theory of speech acts. The structure of speech acts reveals to Habermas the potential of
communicative interaction to establish a coherent integration between all ontological
dimensions, precisely because language is the medium for intersubjective adjustment, in all
three types of world signification, whether objective (we can talk about facts); subjective (we
can talk about impressions and feelings); or and normative (we can talk about moral
statements). In this sense, through communicative agreement, Habermas argues that we can
reach “community idealization,” i.e., reach social justice without denying our interests and
self-aspirations.
For our purposes, we focus on a particular element of the Habermasian theory,
strategic action. Put very simply, strategic actions arise when the interlocutor is concerned
with the success orientation of the speech act and, in this concern, systematically distorts
communication. Although this kind of social action is rational, it is so in the objective
dimension only; from a wider ontological perspective, strategic action is contrary to the
ethical claims of a community of speech and it compromises the assumption of reciprocity
made by a moral orientation, which is present in all human interaction (White, 1995).
If reciprocity and trust are both important elements for reaching communication
action, there are at the same time pre-linguistic constraints, the structural issues which
stimulate the adoption of strategic action (Felts, 1992; Forester, 1983). In addition, Habermas
(1985) proposes that strategic action is built upon systematic communicative distortion. This
means that, to achieve a perlocutionary speech act, the speaker needs to manipulate its
validity claims. Rather than be deviant in their behaviour, speakers make a communicative
distortion, a mechanism to manipulate the intersubjective process, because, in doing so, they
can attain success.
In simple terms, communicative distortion is any speech act performed consciously by
a speaker with the intention to manipulate meaning as is perceived by his/her interlocutors. In
this sense, the main speech acts in this category are lies (truth distortion), insincerities
(expression distortion), dishonesties (moral distortion) and misunderstandings (intelligibility
distortion). Because a speech act has four validity claims, communicative distortion can
affect four issues. Thus, when speakers perform a strategic action, they distortcommunicative
interaction by omitting or manipulating information (distorting truthfulness), being insincere
about their own hidden intentions and/or pretending feelings which they lack (distorting
sincerity), adopting illegitimate or subverting legitimate moral claims (distorting legitimacy)
and/or being confused or ambiguous about what they are saying (distorting
comprehensibility). All these strategies of communicative distortion assume a teleological
function in the construction of intersubjective interaction, because they are used in order to
manipulate the meanings shared by the subjects involved in the interaction. In this sense, the
speakers’ know that, without this manipulation of meanings, they may find it hard to reach
success in the action.
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In critical organization research, this approach is used in management discourse in
particular to describe communication, which is systematically distorted. Forester (1983) and
Vizeu (2011), taking this approach, point out some aspects of management rhetoric, which
illustrate how managers use discourse in this strategic way.Table 1 (below) shows some
examples of rhetoric in the management area and how each one distorts the claims in the
ideal speech act relationship.
Table 1: Valid Claims in a Speech Act
Valid Claim
Truth

Possibility of Questioning
whether
What is said is true

Sincerity

What is said is sincere

Legitimacy

What is said is legitimate or
morally accepted

Comprehensibility

What is said is intelligible

Example
“We’re having financial
problems and we must to
cut people…”
“…and I am worried about
your situation…”
“…however, we do it in a
fair way, accord to the
labour laws”
“Everyone understood the
terms?”

Source: Vizeu (2011, p. 66)
Organization studies and strategic action
In organization studies, the communicative standpoint on social interaction appears as
a fruitful perspective, because it offers interesting theoretical points which can analyze
practical problems in fieldwork performance. In this sense, the Habermasian dichotomy of
communicative interaction/strategic action and communicative action shows the tension
between researchers’ interest in being successful in a complex fieldwork project and their
claims of carrying out the fieldwork ethically.
To qualify the complexity oforganization studies fieldwork, we can follow the view
that the “researcher acts as his/her own research instrument” (Schultze, 2000, p. 7). One
argument for this view is that there are many challenges in fieldwork, which force researchers
to use all the available tools to ensure success in their research project. Following Habermas’
theory, we go further, arguing that the concern for research success may entailacting
strategically. This means that, for their purposes, organization researchers have to be capable
of lying, hiding and simulating feelings, providing misleading information and so on, all in
the name of research viability. And, the more impediments are perceived to fieldwork
performance, the more organization researchers are tempted to distort their communication.
Searching carefully in organizational fieldwork reports, we can find researchers
performing strategic actions. To show how they can occur, we present three remarkable
cases. All of them show the ambiguous way in which communicative distortions ensued
when a researcher faced threats to his/herown research purposes. They also reveal that, to
reduce the obstaclesto research, researchers may deny their own ethical claims.
The first case is an organizational ethnographic report by Alcadipani and Hodgson
(2009). The research had a critically-oriented approach by one of the authors to a British
newspaper. Here, we are interested in the researcher’s report on his difficulties in gaining
access to the organization. The authors describe a complex context of negotiation and
bargaining, which reveals many problems over guaranteeing the basic research conditions.
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These problems led the researcher to accept a role, which he did not want: the manager
suggested he should be his ‘eyes and ears’ among the workers. Although this request left the
researcher very disturbed, he failed to confront it. His justification is presented below:
I was deeply unhappy about his remarks, but I decided at this point to keep
quiet. My intention was to see how things would develop, in the belief that
anything I said at this point could only endanger the precarious research access
I had barely established and with the intention of dealing with this situation as
and when it arose. (Alcadipani & Hodgson, 2009, p. 136)
In this case, the communicative distortion was manifested by silence, because, in
keeping quiet, the researcher did not voice his discomfort with the manager’s proposition. He
also manifested concern about the ethical implications of this attitude, showing how hard it is
to maintain ethical principles in the context of practising organization fieldwork, as shown
below:
The set of conditions and power relations within the field associated with
access also impacted how I deployed what seem to be very neutral and
straightforward ethical principles in practice. During fieldwork, situations
were much more complex and fluid than any code or principle could predict.
(Alcadipani & Hodgson, 2009, 140)
Another interesting case is presented by Bruni (2006). It was a piece of critical
organization research conducted in the editorial office of a gay newspaper. His report account
addresses the problem of sexual orientation in doing organizational research, but at the same
time reveals the problem of communicative distortion and a manipulative attitude on the part
of the researcher. In this case, one particular event in a fieldwork process demonstrates it very
well. It was the researcher’s deliberate failure to clarify his real sexual orientation. As we can
see in the following description, this decision was made by the researcher in order to make a
good impression on the researched, which – he probably imagined – would affect the
research positively:
One day the person I was shadowing said to me: ‘have you got a boyfriend or
are you single?’ Seeing that I’m male I realized that he thought I was
homosexual. As it happened, I had no partner at the time and so I simply
answered that I was “single.” The conversation stopped there, for the time
being. I knew that he thought I was gay but I couldn’t understand why. (Bruni,
2006, p. 300)
Knowing that the researched was homosexual (and male), Bruni (2006) admits that he
himself distorted communication – because he did not say that he was heterosexual. In so
doing, he allowed his own sexual orientation to be misinterpreted. He argues that he was
tempted to do it because “being considered an insider for [his] participant observation” would
have had its advantages (Bruni, 2006, p. 301). In fact, he admits dishonesty in his evasive
first positioning, which in this event of communicative interaction could represent his
acceptance of the prevalent utilitarian orientation and a manipulative intention, as we see
below:
…but you are gay, aren’t you? This was the final phrase in his explanation of
why he thought I was gay. As a question it left no room for evasion; the
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answer could only be “yes” or “no.” I was seriously embarrassed, more than
anything else because saying “yes” would have been an outright lie, while
saying “no” would reveal that I had been dishonest with him. (Bruni, 2006, p.
301)
The fact that the organization researcher wondered whether to say “yes” or “no”
shows us the tension between being ethical and being successful in a fieldwork project, which
is well accounted for in Habermas’ theoretical dichotomy of strategic and communicative
action. This dilemma in doing organization studies has been pointed out by others, for
example, Alcadipani and Hodgson (2009) and Taylor (1987), whose work provides the third
experience that we analyze.
Taylor (1987) presents a dilemma in which a researcher wondered whether or not to
report abusive behaviour during fieldwork. In this case, we are not specifically interested in
the main problem pointed out by the author, namely, the specific abuses identified. Our
concern is how the researcher dealt with this ethical dilemma and why he chose opportunistic
behaviour as his solution. Once more, we argue, the motivation was to maintain the good
relationship existing between the researcher and his group of researched persons.
In his fieldwork account, Taylor (1987) shows how difficult it was to build rapport
with his observed group, demonstrating all the paradoxes and complexities of fieldwork, as &
Hodgson (2009) point out in relation to access. However, Taylor’s case reveals a more
conflictive situation, in which the researcher faces an unethical practice, which he wants to
critique, and hence – because he distorts the communicative understanding of his ethical
position – he includes himself in this social practice. Referring to the abuse of patients by the
attendants in a mental hospital, the researcher demonstrates the subordination of his ethical
claims to his concern to conduct successful fieldwork:
While intervening in attendants’ abuse might have soothed my conscience and
perhaps helped the men temporarily, it almost certainly would have spelled an
end to my rapport with attendants and thus circumscribed the opportunities to
collect data on their everyday routines and activities. (Taylor, 1987, p. 293)
The three examples shown above demonstrate how organization researchers dealt with
ambiguity in doing their job. Obviously, organizations are complicated social research sites
for any social researcher, because several issues emerge which require much more
complicated research than in other fields (Bell, 1999; Rosen, 1991). As noted above, this is
because organizations are sites surrounded by a climate of suspicion. This leads people who
work in organizations to interact by adopting a distrustful attitude; they always assume that
other people will take advantage of them (in fact, to do their jobs, members of organizations
often need to be opportunistic in their relationships). This is true for managersin particular,
who are constantly under pressure to behave in a utilitarian way (Watson, 2003). Thus, they
are always bargaining, attempting to gain the advantage from anyone and, in so doing, to
attain the goals of the organization. From the Habermasian standpoint, the opportunistic
approach of management practices is closely associated with strategic action (Alvesson &
Deetz, 1996), performed by managers through specific processes of communication that they
systematically distort (Felts, 1992; Forester, 1983).
Since organization researchers areinvolved in the same climate of suspicion felt bythe
membersof the organization studied, it is easy to imagine them acting in the same
opportunistic way. As Bell notes (1999, p. 18), “fieldwork relationships in organizations tend
to be presented instrumentally and opportunistically”. Besides, organization researchers are
also under pressure to obtain results which will satisfy their supporting groups (universities,
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research institutes, research sponsors and so on) and consequently they do their work in ways
which incorporate opportunistic behaviour. This represents another factor in making
organization studies more complicated to strip of ethical ambiguity. But, not as easy as
declaring how difficult it is to do fieldwork, is the obligation of organization researchers to
admit that to do it they must use unacceptable means (for the researched). For this reason, I
decided to illustrate my arguments by exploring my own research.
My confession
In order to clarify how strategic action appears in the process of organization studies
fieldwork, I present an experience of my own. It rests on assumptions of auto-ethnography,
i.e., when the researcher aims to analyze his/her own research practices, seeking “to give a
self-revealing and self reflexive account of the research process” (Schultze, 2000, p. 4). In
this sense, it followed the methodological tendency of some organizational researchers who
adopt a confessional ethnographic approach (Alcadipani & Hodgson, 2009; Bell, 1999;
Schultze, 2000), which implies introducing in the field notes a confessional approach to the
research process, or, as Van Maanen (1988) has named it, confessional writing.
In my fieldnotes, confessional writing falls under the heading ‘my daily impressions
and feelings’. It consists in a description of my feelings and related thoughts before/after
routines in which I took part. I was writing with the purpose of revealing my emotional state
at the time. The original interest was to reflect on my perception of the organizational site in
question, considering my emotional bias. For example, if on a certain day I was very sad
because I had had a quarrel that morning, I would pay more attention in my fieldnotes of that
day. In the presentpaper, I explore my emotions, only in the sense that to do so may reveal
my communicative orientation in emotionally critical situations, in particular, those events,
which I feel were critical to the success of the research, project at the time.
The illustrative case was a critical study, which I was conducting in a psychiatric
hospital. Data were gathered during eight months of fieldwork as part of my dissertation for a
master’s degree. The research aimed to investigate the rupture with traditional psychiatric
approaches in the hospital, because it had adopted the criteria of Brazilian psychiatric
reforms. Its main theoretical orientation in so doing rested on Foucault’s critical views of the
approach of modern psychiatry and Goffman’s critique that mental asylums could be
interpreted as total institutions and bureaucratic organizations. For this reason, my research
could be considered as affiliated to a critical tradition in organization studies, which was one
more complicating obstacle to the viability of my research project, bearing in mind the
suspicions of managers about the results of critically oriented research (Alcadipani &
Hodgson, 2009).
In this illustrative case, two important moments are worth mentioning, which reveal
that the strategic action was related to the fear of research failure. The first moment was when
I needed to negotiate the terms of the research project with the top manager of the hospital.
As I was afraid that she would not agree to my research terms, I was not fully sincere in
explaining the objective of my study.
In the account in my fieldnotes, my thoughts and feelings at a moment when I was
waiting in the lobby of the hospital manager’s office reveal that I was afraid of what
mightresult from the next conversation. I realized that the hospital manager had the power to
disapprove of my research and, for this reason, I decided to focus all my energy on
convincing her that I was a person to be trusted and my research would be good for the
hospital. Thus, when I was explaining my research issues, I was reticent about the terms,
which I judged to be controversial and in fact chose to suppress them. Thus many aspects of
my research project were omitted; I denied that my research was critically-oriented; I was not
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clear about whom I would talk to and observe; in sum, I tried hard to paint a favorable picture
of my research.
In the interview, the hospital manager asked me if I agreed with her about areas where
I had not formed an opinion. I simply answered, “yes,” because I thought that this was a good
answer and would please her. After the meeting, the only thing that I could think of was: “I
got it! She will let me in! I am so excited to begin.”
The second kind of communicative distortion arose when I was in situations, which
would have revealed my position as a researcher. Although I never denied that I was doing
research, because I chose to enter the hospital as a volunteer worker (in order to perform
participant observation), hospital members were often confused about my real status.
In organizational ethnography, a very common way for researchers to participate is to
let them work as management consultants (Bell, 1999). However, to observe the interactions
that mattered to my research, management activities were not a good option, being
undertaken far from patient units. Therefore, I had to engage in other types of activity, some
of which were performed near the patients and attendants. Thus, I asked permission of the
hospital manager to enter the hospital’s volunteer programme. For this programme, I chose
musical activities, because I can play the guitar and piano. I began work as a volunteer for
three days a week in a unit for female patients under the supervision of an occupational
therapist.
Of course, for the patients and attendants, volunteer status was less threatening than
researcher status; consequently, I used to conceal the fact that I was a researcher. I did it
because I was afraid to compromise the sense of belonging to the hospital community and its
impact on the research results. For instance, when I was among people who did not know
about my research, if someone who knew about it informed the audience by a comment (for
example, that someone would be an interesting interviewee for my purposes), then the others
would look at me in surprise and ask “What kind of research are you doing?” I used to
answer: “I am here to play the guitar and this is what matters.” This evasive answer was
commonly followed by my playing a popular song, which made everyone sing and forget a
conversation, which I found embarrassing.
Conclusions
Organization researchers often claim more ethical orientation than the organizations,
which they investigate. However, when they themselves are under pressure in their own
research projects, they do not seem to mind strategic behaviour on their own part, which, in a
Habermasian sense, is a kind of social action devoid of ethical claims. We understand this
problem as a serious contradiction between discourse and practice, which emerges in
particular when researchers are involved in critical organizational research. This paper has
concentrated on such ethical dilemmas.
The illustrative case shows that, rather than indicating a lack of ethical consciousness,
the opportunistic behaviour adopted by the organization researcher seems to be a
consequence of being under pressure to secure academic results, namely, papers reporting
research findings and “discoveries,: or, in my case, the obtaining of a master’s degree. Thus,
to be successful, researchers must tolerate their own opportunistic behaviour, which, in some
cases, means being unethical.
As scholars, we deal with the same problems as any modern professional must deal
with (i.e., being successful in a professional career). Here, the meaning of success is
historically situated and reflects the modern concern with economic results. As a
consequence, scholars are workers involved in the pressure to get results which take into
account the capitalist world. They are induced to think of their own work relationships in a
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utilitarian way, where the only thing to matter is productive improvement. In this sense, the
working rules which organization scholars are concerned to deconstruct are paradoxically the
same as those, which they use in their own careers. In a capitalist world, we have to work
productively, in the same way as others in different working categories are pressurized to do
(to illustrate this argument, see Alcadipani’s confessions. This text smoothly points out how
concern with results can overlap the critical researcher’s value orientation).
According to Habermas’ theory, performing strategic action has unethical
implications, which arise when the interlocutor is concerned with the success orientation of
the speech act and, in so doing, systematically distorts communication and meanings. The
apparent rationality of this kind of social action is valid merely in an objective dimension;
from a wider ontological perspective, strategic action is contrary to the ethical claims of a
community of speech and it is built on a denial of the reciprocity which is presumed in the
moral status of human relationships.
Strategic action affects the performance of the organization studies fieldwork, in such
a way that researchers need to re-invent their own practices. Otherwise, they will not be able
to avoid contradicting their own theoretical principles. Thus, in the research experience
described above, we sought to show that organizations are research sites where researchers
are constantly under pressure from two opposite kinds of claim. We describe these claims in a
Habermasian theoretical language, as the tension in a speech act between a success
orientation and an understanding orientation. In addition, experience reveals that the critical
researcher can be exposed to psychological dilemmas. It should be highlighted that
researchers need more extensive ethical reflection during the research design stage. This
specific reorientation of organization studies practices should be understood as an effort to
extend emancipatory claims beyond an idealist intention.
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